The Multiple Discrete-continuous Extreme Value Model (MDCEV) with Fixed Costs  by Tanner, Reto & Bolduc, Denis
 Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  111 ( 2014 )  390 – 399 
1877-0428 © 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of Scientific Committee
doi: 10.1016/j.sbspro.2014.01.072 
ScienceDirect
EWGT2013 – 16th Meeting of the EURO Working Group on Transportation 
The Multiple Discrete-Continuous Extreme Value Model 
(MDCEV) with fixed costs 
Reto Tannera, Denis Bolducb,* 
aUniversity of Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaftslehre, Schanzeneckstrasse 1, CH-3001 Bern, Switzerland 
bUniversité Laval Québec, Département d’économique, 1025 Avenue des Sciences Humaines, (Québec), G1V 0A6, Canada 
Abstract 
In this paper, we present a model that can be viewed as an extension of the traditional Tobit model. As opposed to that 
specific model, ours also accounts for the fixed costs of car ownership. That extension is needed since being carless is an 
option for many households in societies having a good system of public transportation. The main reason for being carless is 
that households wish to save the fixed costs of car ownership. So far, no existing model can adequately capture the impact of 
these fixed costs on car ownership. The Multiple Discrete-Continuous Extreme Value Model (MDCEV) with fixed costs fills 
this gap. In fact, this model can evaluate the effect of policies intended to influence household behaviour with respect to car 
ownership. This can be of great interest to policy makers. Our model makes it possible to compute the effect of policies such 
as taxes on fuel or on car ownership on both the share of carless households and the average driving distance.  
We calibrated the model using data on Swiss private households in order to be able to forecast responses to policies. One 
result of particular interest that cannot be produced by other models is the evaluation of the impact of a tax on car ownership. 
Our results show that a tax on car ownership has a much lower impact on aggregate driving demand – per unit of tax revenues 
– than a tax on fuel. 
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1. Introduction 
The drawbacks of the existing modeling techniques can be summarized as follows: The OLS fails to map 
carless households. The Tobit model is unable to map the impact of fixed costs. The sample selection model fails 
due to the lack of an instrumental variable: there is no variable that influences only the choice of whether or not to 
own a car whilst not influencing the demand for driving at the same time. An interesting candidate for solving this 
problem is the Discrete-Continuous Choice model introduced by Dubin and McFadden (1984). This model can be 
used to explore the ownership of certain car types and their use. Unfortunately, the model only allows the choice 
of being carless to be captured if the annual mileage travelled using public transport is given in the dataset. Since 
this information is not available in most micro-census datasets, this model cannot be applied. 
The Multiple Discrete-Continuous Extreme Value Model (MDCEV) with fixed costs overcomes the 
drawbacks of these models. As mentioned above, the proposed model can measure the impact of changes in the 
fixed costs of cars on driving demand and on the probability of households being carless. This ability to map the 
impact of income, fuel price and the fixed costs of car ownership on both car ownership and car use could not be 
found in the literature.1 The MDCEV model makes it possible to compute the effects of policies such as taxes on 
fuel or car ownership on both the share of carless households and the average driving distance.  
The MDCEV model was introduced by Bhat (2005). 2 This model consists of a direct utility function and a 
budget restriction. It is assumed that it maps the utility maximisation process of a household and is based on the 
assumption that a household chooses certain amounts of goods from a set of goods including the possibility of a 
household choosing not to consume any good at all. This means that a household may choose not to consume any 
goods at all. In order to adapt the model for examining car ownership and car use, we modified this model in two 
ways: first, we restricted it to the case with only two goods. This means that households may only choose whether 
or not to own and use a car and spend the remaining income for a consumption basket containing any other good. 
Secondly, we extended this model to the case where driving a car requires car ownership, incurring fixed costs, 
which is our contribution to the theory. 
2. Assumption on household behaviour 
The basic idea behind the model is described in the following. We assume that all decisions are taken at the 
household level. In the case of non-single households, we do not make any assumptions on who might have the 
most influence on the driving decisions. We also assume that each household compares the utility yielded from 
the following two options: first, it establishes the utility level it would gain if it owned a car. In this case, the 
household income would be reduced by the fixed costs of car ownership. Given that the household would then 
decide what annual distance it would drive in order to yield maximal utility. Note that the household spends its 
remaining income entirely on good one, which we consider to be a consumer basket containing all goods apart 
from car driving, e.g. housing, food, medical care, holidays, and so on. We assume that utility is driven 
exclusively by the kilometres driven and not by the car ownership. Second, we assume that the household 
 
1
 One exception is the model of De Jong (1990), used later by Ramjerdi and Rand (1992) and Bjorner (1999). In contrast to our model, it is 
based on an indirect utility function instead of a direct function. Unfortunately, De Jong's (1990) model has an assumption that violates its 
compatibility with a microeconomic utility maximisation framework. In addition, it yields rather unrealistic results, particularly with respect 
to the impact of changes in fixed costs on car ownership. We believe that the MDCEV model with fixed costs maps reality much more 
effectively and lead to realistic results. 
2
 The first application of Bhat's model was to explain the time tourists spend for different activities. The model reflects that each activity can 
be chosen or not and how many hours are spent for the activities, subject to the time restriction of 24 hours a day, Bhat (2005). Later, Bhat 
applied this modeling framework to the case where households can choose to own none, one or several cars of different car types and decide 
of the driving distances the different cars are used for, Bhat (2006). In this model, Bhat ignores the fact that holding cars causes fixed costs 
and thus according to the model it would not be irrational to hold a number of cars even when the preference for car driving is low. Thus, we 
want to overcome this drawback by introducing fixed cost in our MDCEV model. 
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establishes the utility in the case that it decides not to own a car. In this case, it would save the fixed costs of car 
ownership and would spend all its income on good one. The household then decides which option would give it 
the highest utility. This behaviour can be mapped using a standard microeconomic utility maximisation approach 
where the utility level can be computed by the direct utility function. The calculation of households' utility 
maximisation as described above can be illustrated as follows: 
 
Fig. 1. Optimum decisions of two households with different preferences 
This figure illustrates the optimal consumption plan of two households with identical income but different car 
driving preferences. The solid lined iso-utility curve ( )
21 2
, Su x x u=  represents a household with a high 
preference for car driving. It decides to own a car – this choice is denoted by index S2 – and chooses 22,Sx
∗
 as its 
optimal annual driving distance given its income y, the fixed costs of car ownership k2 and marginal driving costs 
p2. We set the price of good one p1 as numeraire, so the utility of x1 can also be interpreted as the utility of income 
remaining after having paid all expenses incurred by the car. With this household, the consumption vector 
( ) ( )
11 2 1
, ,0Sx x y p
∗
=  is below the iso-utility curve and therefore yields a lower utility. In contrast, the dashed 
lined iso-utility curve ( )
11 2
, Su x x u=  represents the household with a low preference for car driving. Since any 
point on the budget line defined by points ( )( )2 20, y k p−  and ( )( )2 1 ,0y k p−  yields a lower utility than 
spending the total income on good one ( ) ( )
11 2 1
, ,0Sx x y p
∗
= , the household decides not to own a car. This 
choice is denoted by index S1. 
3. Derivation of the MDCEV Model and its Maximum Likelihood function  
Our choice of the utility function corresponds to the one in Bhat (2005:686). Since in our model, a household 
can only choose between the good “annual car driving distance” x2 and consumption basket x1 containing all other 
goods, the utility function is then written as: 
( ) ( ) ( )1 21 1 2 2expd dU X a m X aβ ς= + + + ⋅ ⋅ + , (1)3 
 
with m sγ= ⋅ , (2) 
 
3
 This utility function is based on the utility function proposed by Bhat (2005:686). 
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ZKHUHς LVDORJLVWLFDOO\GLVWULEXWHGVWRFKDVWLFSDUDPHWHU 
 
( ) 1 .
1ς
ς
−
=
+
∼
x
F x
e
       (3) 
:HDVVXPH DpositivePDUJLQDO XWLOLW\ WKDW LV GHFUHDVLQJ LQ DOO DUJXPHQWV DQG FRQFDYH %RWK 1d DQG 2d DUH
ERXQGHGWROLHEHWZHHQ]HURDQGRQH 0 1, 1,2jd j< < = ZKLFKLVFRPSDWLEOHZLWKWKHVHDVVXPSWLRQVRQWKHXWLOLW\
IXQFWLRQ41RWHWKDWWKHVPDOOHU jd LVWKHIDVWHUWKHPDUJLQDOXWLOLW\RIJRRGMGHFUHDVHVZKHQ;MLQFUHDVHV1RWH
IXUWKHUWKDWWKHUHH[LVWPRGLILHGXWLOLW\IXQFWLRQV–VHH%KDW–WKDWFRUUHVSRQGWRQHJDWLYHYDOXHVRIGDQG
WKXVWRHYHQVKDUSHUGHFUHDVHVLQPDUJLQDOXWLOLW\6LQFHRXUUHVXOWVVKRZWKDWWKHUHVWULFWLRQ 0 < jd  is not binding, 
we did not compute the model based on these more general utility functions. 3DUDPHWHUV D DQG D FDQ EH
FRQVLGHUHGDVVKLIWLQJSDUDPHWHUVVLQFHWKH\FDQPRYHWKHindifferenceFXUYHVRIWKHXWLOLW\IXQFWLRQDORQJWKH[-
DQGLQWKH\-D[LVUHVSHFWLYHO\1RWHWKDWWKHPDUJLQDOXWLOLW\RI;LVLQILQLWHLI;DSSURDFKHV 1a− ZKLFKLVDOVR
WUXHLI;DSSURDFKHV 2a− 7KHYDOXHV 1a− DQG 2a− WKHUHIRUHGHILQHWKHORZHUOLPLWVRIRSWLPDOVROXWLRQVIRU;
DQG; UHVSHFWLYHO\ 6LQFH FRQVXPSWLRQ EDVNHW; FRQWDLQV HVVHQWLDO JRRGV VXFK DV IRRG DQG KRXVLQJ LW PXVW
DOZD\VEHFRQVXPHG7KHUHIRUHDLVQRQ-SRVLWLYHLQRUGHUWRHQVXUHWKDWWKHVROXWLRQIRU;LVDOZD\VSRVLWLYH
)ROORZLQJ%KDW5ZHFKRRVH 1 0a =  since this insures an infinite marginal utility if ;JRHVWR]HURZKLFK
LPSOLHV WKDW DOZD\V D SRVLWLYH DPRXQW RI ; has to be consumed6Expression ( )exp m β ς+ ⋅ LV D ZHLJKW RQ( ) 22 2 dX a+ 7KHKLJKHU ( )exp m β ς+ ⋅ LVWKHVWURQJHULVWKHSUHIHUHQFHIRUGULYLQJ7KLVZHLJKWLVGHWHUPLQHGE\
VRFLR-GHPRJUDSKLFYDULDEOHV LQV WKDW LQIOXHQFH WKHSUHIHUHQFHIRUGULYLQJm sγ= ⋅ 7KLVPHDQV IRU LQVWDQFH
WKDWKRXVHKROGVLQUXUDODUHDVXVXDOO\KDYHDJUHDWHUSUHIHUHQFHIRUGULYLQJ WKDQKRXVHKROGVLQXUEDQDUHDV,ID
KRXVHKROGPRYHVIURPDQXUEDQWRDUXUDODUHDWKHUHIRUHPLVH[SHFWHGWRLQFUHDVHLQOLQHZLWKDQLQFUHDVHLQWKH
KRXVHKROG
VSUHIHUHQFHIRUFDUGULYLQJ7KHUDQGRPWHUP ς UHSUHVHQWVVRFLR-GHPRJUDSKLFYDULDEOHV s WKDWFDQQRW
EHREVHUYHGE\WKHUHVHDUFKHUDQGWKDWFDQEHLQWHUSUHWHGDVDQXQREVHUYHGSUHIHUHQFHIRUFDUGULYLQJ)ROORZLQJ
%KDWZHDVVXPHWKLV UDQGRPWHUPWREHORJLVWLFDOO\GLVWULEXWHG1RWHWKDW WKHSUHIHUHQFHIRUGULYLQJP
GRHVQRWFRQWDLQDQ\FDU-VSHFLILFFRPSRQHQWVLQFHWKHPRGHOFDSWXUHVRQO\RQHFDUW\SHZKLFKLVDVVXPHGWREH
WKHVDPHIRUHDFKKRXVHKROG7RDOORZIRUDVXEVWDQWLDOVLPSOLILFDWLRQDQG WRDYRLG LGHQWLILFDWLRQSUREOHPVZH
FKRRVHWRVHW7 
 
1 2.d d d= =  (4) 
 
We assume WKDW the household maximises its utility by selecting optimal values for X1 and X2, subject to its 
budget constraint: 
 
4
 For a prove, see Tanner and Bolduc (2012), Appendix A2. 
5
 “Note that there is no translation parameter kγ  for the first good, because the first good is always consumed” Bhat (2008: 290). Note that 
kγ , which Bhat uses, corresponds to kα , which we use. 
6
 This is called that the so-called INADA-condition ( )
1
1 2 10
lim , ,..,
→
∂ ∂ = ∞J
x
u x x x x   is fulfilled for x1. The INADA-condition ensures that x1 is 
greater than zero when solving the maximisation problem. 
7
 Bhat (2008) even proposes that some parameter values are fixed: “Alternatively, the analyst can stick with one functional form a priori, but 
experiment with various fixed values of kα  for the kγ -profile [...]”; Bhat (2008: 282), footnote 9. The term “functional form” refers to the 
three utility functions (32) in Bhat (2008: 290). The so-called “ kγ -profile” corresponds to the model based on the third utility function of 
(32) in Bhat (2008: 290). The utility function (1) we use is a positively transformed function of that third utility function; we fix its parameter 
value 1 2d d d= =  and estimate all other parameters. 
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( )1 1 2 2 2 20y p X p X I X k= ⋅ + ⋅ + > ⋅ , (5) 
 
where k2 stands for the fixed costs of car ownership, ( )2 0I X >  is an indicator function that takes the value one 
if 2 0X >  and zero otherwise, k2 and the non-negativity constraint 2 0X ≥ : 
 
Solving this maximisation problem for the cases S1 and S2 yields:  
 
1
1
,0S
y
u u
p
§ ·
= ¨ ¸© ¹
and 
2
2 2 2
2
1
,S
y k p x
u u x
p
§ ·− − ⋅
= ¨ ¸© ¹
 (6) 
 
where x2 is the Marshallian demand function corresponding to the case S2: 
 
( )
2
2
1
2 2 1 2 2
2
1
, , , ,
1
y kA a
p
x y k p p A a pA
p
−
⋅ −
− =
+ ⋅
 with ( )
1
1
1
2
exp
dpA m
p
β ς −§ ·= ⋅ + ⋅¨ ¸© ¹
. (7) 
 
By use of the utility functions 
1S
u and 
2S
u  (6), the value of the probability of a household choosing not to own 
a car can be computed: 
 
( ) ( )2 1 2 20 | , , , , cP X p p y k Fςθ ς= = , (8) 
 
where ( )ς ς cF  denotes the density function of the logistic distribution and ( )1 2 2, , , ,ς ς θ=c c p p y k  corresponds to 
the so-called “critical” unobserved preference given all parameters and economic variables at which the 
household would switch from owning a car to being carless, 
2 1
| 0ς ς≥− ≥cS Su u  and 2 1 | 0ς ς<− <cS Su u . Note that the 
Marshallian demand (7) at ς
c
 is always greater than zero and that ς
c
 is always unique. 
The density of the Marshallian demand can be computed using the first-order conditions of the Lagrangian 
associated with the utility maximisation problem: 
 
( ) ( )2 2 1 2 21 2 2 10
2 2 1 2
1
1
1 1 1| , , , , , with 0X X V V pd df z p p y k s f ay k p z p z a
a
p
ςθ β β∧ >
§ ·¨ ¸§ − · − −¨ ¸− = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + =¨ ¸
− − +¨ ¸© ¹ +¨ ¸© ¹
, (9) 
where ( ) ( ) ( ) 2 21 1
1
ln ln 1 ln y k p zV d p d
p
§ ·− −
= − − − ⋅ ¨ ¸© ¹
, ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 2 2ln ln 1 lnV d p m d z a= − − − − ⋅ +  
and ( ) ( )21
x
x
ef x
e
ς
−
−
=
+
 is the density of the logistically distributed random term ς . 
Since we assume that the random terms ς  are independent across households, the Maximum Likelihood 
function is thus: 
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( )( )2 2 1 2 1,2,.., 1,2,.., 2 1,2,..,1,2,.., | , , , , ,MLE n n N n N n Nn NL X x p p y k sθ = = === , 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 22 20 02 1 2 2 2 1 2 20
1
0 | , , , , , | , , , , ,n n
N N
I x I x
n n n n n n n nX X
n i n
P x p p y k s f x p p y k sθ θ= >
∧ >
= =
= = ⋅ −∏ ∏   
 
ZKHUH ( )0I z > DQG ( )0I z = DUH LQGLFDWRU IXQFWLRQVEHLQJRQHZKHQ WKHDUJXPHQW LV WUXHDQG]HURRWKHUZLVH
9HFWRUθ FRQWDLQVDOOSDUDPHWHUV { }2, , ,d aθ γ β= 3UREDELOLW\ ( )P LVGHILQHG LQ DQGGHQVLW\ ( ) ( )2 2 0∧ > X Xf 
LQ,QGH[QFRUUHVSRQGVWRWKHQ-WKREVHUYDWLRQLQWKHGDWDVHW 
,W LV LPSRUWDQWWRQRWHWKDW WKLVOLNHOLKRRGIXQFWLRQLVRQO\GHILQHGIRUYDOXHV 2 0nx = DQG ( )2 2 ,n c nx x ς≥ VLQFH
IRU YDOXHV 2nx LQ LQWHUYDO ( )2 2 ,0 n c nx x ς< < WKH SUREDELOLW\ RI REVHUYDWLRQ LV ]HUR 7KXV DV VRRQ DV DQ\
REVHUYDWLRQEHORQJVWRWKHLQWHUYDO ( )2 2 ,0 n c nx x ς< < WKHOLNHOLKRRGIXQFWLRQHTXDOV]HURZKLFKPDNHVLW
LPSRVVLEOH WR FRPSXWH RSWLPDO SDUDPHWHUV θ XVLQJ WKH 0D[LPXP /LNHOLKRRG (VWLPDWLRQ URXWLQH :H WKXV
SURSRVHDQHVWLPDWLRQURXWLQHZKHUHDOOREVHUYDWLRQV ( )2 2 ,0 n c nx x ς< < DUHUHPRYHGIURPWKHGDWDVHWEHIRUHZH
DSSO\WKH0D[LPXP/LNHOLKRRG(VWLPDWLRQURXWLQH6LQFHWKHYDOXH ( )2 ,c nx ς RQO\GHSHQGVRQSDUDPHWHUVDDQG
GSDUDPHWHUVȖDQGȕFDQWKHQEHFRPSXWHGE\0D[LPXP/LNHOLKRRGHVWLPDWLRQXVLQJWKHPRGLILHGGDWDVHWDQG
JLYHQSDUDPHWHUVDDQGG6LQFHERWKDDQGGDOVRLQIOXHQFHWKHVKDSHRIWKHGHQVLW\IXQFWLRQDVZHOODVWKH
SUREDELOLW\WKDWDKRXVHKROGLVFDUOHVVZHFDQQRWVHWWKHPDUELWUDULO\)RUWKLVUHDVRQZHSURSRVHPLQLPLVLQJ
WKHIROORZLQJ³SHQDOW\IXQFWLRQ´IRUFKRRVLQJRSWLPDOYDOXHVIRUSDUDPHWHUVDDQGG 
 
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
2 2 2
1 2
mean 0 mean # elim. observations
mean 0 mean size of initial observations
sim simP X x E X xQ c c
x x
§ · § ·− = − § ·
= + ⋅ + ⋅¨ ¸ ¨ ¸ ¨ ¸¨ ¸ ¨ ¸
= © ¹© ¹ © ¹
, (11) 
 
where c1 and c2 weigh the corresponding error components and ( )2 0simP X = and ( )2simE X  are defined as 
follows: 
 
( ) ( )2 2 1 2 2
1
10 0 | , , , , ,
N
sim n n n n
n
P X P X p p y k s
N
θ
=
= = ⋅ =¦ ,  (12) 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )2 2
2 2
2 ,
2 1 2 20
1
1 | , , , ,
ς
θ
= −
∧ >
=
=
= ⋅ ⋅ −¦ ³n n
c n
z y k pN
sim n n n nX X
n z x
E X z f z p p y k s dz
N
. (13) 
 
1. 7KHUHIRUHZHSURSRVHWKHIROORZLQJHVWLPDWLRQURXWLQH 
2. &KRRVHYDOXHVIRUGDQGD. 
3. Eliminate all observations with ( )2 2 ,0 n c nx x ς< <  from the dataset. 
4. Estimate parameters Ȗ by MLE conditional on d and a2 using (10). 
5. Compute the penalty function (11). 
6. Repeat steps 1 to 4 for a number of different values IRUGDQGa2(grid search).  
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7. Choose values d and a2 so that the lowest value of the penalty function is yielded (“optimal values” d 
and a2). 
Note that functions (12) and (13) are also used to compute aggregate impacts on driving demand and the 
probability of being carless when the economic variables p2, k2 and y change, e.g. these functions will be used to 
compute the corresponding elasticities.  
4. Empirical Results 
We obtained results using the micro-census data about travel behaviour in Switzerland collected in 2005 by the 
Swiss Federal Statistical Office SFSO.8 We chose this data because it contains a large number of observations, 
namely 33,000, and a number of useful socio-demographic variables concerning the households. Since our model 
captures only one car type, it is considered to be an “average car”. The fixed costs of maintaining a car and the 
marginal costs of driving are thus assumed to be equal to those of an average car owned by a Swiss household. 
The values we retain for k2 and p2 were taken from the Swiss touring club TCS (2007) and comprise:9 
 
2 7033k =  and 2 0.1601+0.0778 fuelp p⋅= , all units are in CHF. (14) 
 
Note that the annual fixed costs k2 mainly consist of depreciation, which is unrelated to the car's use, such as 
rusting, and loss in value due to the technical progress of new cars, capital costs, taxes on car ownership and 
parking costs. Since we neglect such costs as evaluation and registration costs, we assume that owing a car is 
similar to renting a car and that households can switch from owning a car to being carless without any cost. The 
costs dependent on the number of kilometres driven consist of fuel costs 0.0778 fuelp⋅  and non-fuel-related costs 
such as the wear of tyres and mechanical components, which account for CHF 0.1601 per kilometre. The fuel 
price fuelp  is the average fuel price from the last twelve months prior to interviewing the household to which the 
information on annual driving distance refers.10 To explain the deterministic component of the preference for 
driving m, we used a dummy “rural” standing for the type of the households' location and a the number of people 
living in the individual households. 
Table 1 below shows the results for two cases. In the case denoted as “”, expectation value ( )2simE X  is 
computed according to (13); in the case of “60,000 km” the upper limit “ ( )2 2n ny k p− ” is replaced by  “
( )( )2 2min ,60,000kmn ny k p− ”. We believe that the latter produces more realistic results since the theoretical 
density (10) has some tail above this value, while as the empirical distribution does not,  since households simply 
have not time to drive such long distances. Thus, integrating to an upper limit above 60,000 km when computing 
(13) would simply result in too high and therefore unrealistic values. Hence, we believe it is justifiable to restrict 
the upper limit of the integral to this value. For the penalty function (11), we choose arbitrarily 1 1c =  and 
2 0.5c = . This choice yields that in the optimum the number of “irrational” observations that are removed 
account for about 9% of the total observations. We propose not to choose values lower than 0.5 for c2, since this 
 
8
 For details see SFSO (2006a) and SFSO (2006b). 
9
 According to TCS (2007), the total annual costs of an average car amounted to CHF 11,600 when the annual distance driven was 15,000 
kilometres (km). 17.4% of these costs, namely CHF 2,018.4, were fuel costs. Based on the average fuel price paid for petrol 98 octane of 
CHF 1.729/litre in 2007 (SFSO 2009), it can be computed that the TCS (2007) based this fuel cost on a fuel consumption of 7.7825 litres/100 
km: (CHF 2,018.4/15,000 km) / (CHF 1.729/litre) = 7.7825 litres/100 km. The fuel costs of an average car per kilometre are therefore 7.7825 
litres/100 km/100 multiplied by the fuel price per litre paid by households. Non-fuel-related marginal costs of a car were calculated to be 
20.7% of the total costs, 0.207 ·  CHF 22,600 = CHF 3,312, amounting to CHF 3,312/15,000 km = CHF 0.1601/km, see TCS (2007). 
10The computation of fuelp  is based on the monthly average price of petrol 98 octane, as published by the SFSO (2009a). 
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would lead to a “dropout-rate” of observations of more than 9%, which we consider a too high. Note, that 
removing these observations should not induce a significant change in the elasticities of driving demand we 
compute, since 9% is only a small portion of the total and further it we assumed that the elasticities of these 
households do not differ much from the other households. It is also important to note that changing parameters c1 
and c2 only has a limited impact on the measures of interest, namely elasticities. We applied values of 0.5, 1.0 
and 2.0 in various combinations on both parameters c1 and c2. Despite this quite dramatic change in the 
parameters of the penalty function, the resulting values of ( )2 2,E X pε  remained in the region of about 13% of its 
absolute value, while the same measure for ( )2 ,E X yε amounted to 20% and both ( )2 20 ,P X pε =  and ( )2 0 ,P X yε =  amounted to 
about 2%.11 The results processed for the aforementioned datasets are as follows: 
 
Upper limit of integrating, ( )2E X  60,000 km 
( )2 2,εE X p ( )0.00691.07− ( )0.00750.67−
( )2 , fuelE X pε ( )0.00310.49− ( )0.00310.28−
( )2 ,εE X y ( )0.00311.17 ( )0.00690.75
( )2 2,εE X k ( )0.00300.16− ( )0.00290.16−
( )2 20 ,ε =P X p ( )0.00520.24 ( )0.00490.24
( )2 0 ,ε = fuelP X p ( )0.000050.14 ( )0.00280.11
( )2 0 ,ε =P X y ( )0.00871.42− ( )0.00811.41−
( )2 20 ,ε =P X k ( )0.01021.27 ( )0.01111.33
The values in parentheses “(...)” represent standard deviations computed using the bootstrapping method with 10 random samples of 200 obs. each. 
The point estimates are based on the complete dataset. 
Table 1. Simulated elasticities when using a modified density function to compute the expectation value. 
The results yielded by the model for the fuel price elasticities of travelling demand ( )2 , fuelE X pε  are of major 
interest. Since our model assumes no costs when switching from owning a car to being carless and vice versa, our 
elasticities can be interpreted as long-term fuel price elasticities. The values of our model “60,000 km” 
correspond approximately to average values determined in international studies (-0.31), such as in Graham and 
Claister (2004). The income elasticity of aggregate driving we obtained (0.77) is also very close to the average 
values established in international studies (0.73) by both Graham and Claister (2005) and Goodwin et. al. (2004). 
In contrast, both values ( )2 0 , 0.026fuelP X pε > =  and ( )2 0 , 0.33P X yε > =  that can be computed from ( )2 0 , fuelP X pε =  and 
( )2 20 ,P X kε =  are quite smaller in absolute value than the elasticities of the car stock determined in international 
 
11
 We applied values of 0.5, 1.0 and 2.0 in various combinations on both parameters c1 and c2. Despite this quite dramatic change in the 
parameters of the penalty function, the resulting values of ( )2 2,E X pε  remained in the region of about 20% of its absolute value, meaning 
( )2 2,E X pε ( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )( )2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2, , , ,max min max min 0.5 0.12E X p E X p E X p E X pε ε ε ε− + ⋅ = , while the same measure for ( )2 ,E X yε  amounts to 
0.2 and for both ( )2 20 ,P X pε =  and ( )2 0 ,P X yε =  to 0.02. Note, that we computed these values only for the case “”, but we believe the measure 
will be similarly small for the case “60,000 km”. 
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studies.12 We explain this difference by the fact that our elasticities refer to the case of “at least one car” and the 
income elasticity for buying a second or even a third car can be assumed to be greater since the latter can be 
considered a luxury good. In contrast, ( )2 20 , 0.31P X kε > =  is quite similar to the values determined by Dargay 
(2001) and Johansson and Shipper (1997) for the elasticity of the car stock with respect to the car's fixed costs. ). 
In their model, this tax was imposed by a tax on car purchase. Annualising one unit of this tax yields an increase 
in the fixed costs of car ownership of about 2%, yielding a 0.6% decrease in car stock. Thus, a 1% increase in 
fixed costs would reduce the vehicle stock by 0.3%.However, it is also important to note that the results found in 
international studies for the elasticity of car ownership vary greatly and thus it is hard to judge whether the values 
a model yields are plausible.  
Furthermore, our model also yields that both elasticities ( )2 , fuelE X pε  and ( )2 ,E X yε  are only weakly driven by 
households that switch to being carless, despite them switching from an annual mileage of about 5,000 km to 
zero – according to the model. This effect contributes only about 2.5% to the total effect on aggregate demand in 
the case of ( )2 ,ε fuelE X p  and 11.5% in the case of ( )2 ,εE X y .
13
  
Finally, an important result of our model is also that the effect of a tax on car ownership on aggregate driving 
distance is – per unit of tax revenue – more than five times weaker than the effect of a tax on fuel.14 
One criticism of calibrating the model and producing these results by using the micro-census dataset of the SFSO 
2005 is that the fuel price does not vary enough across households. For this reason, we also calibrate the model 
by using stated preference datasets with a large variation in fuel price.15 It is important to note that all elasticities 
with respect to the aggregate driving demand produced by using this dataset differ at most by 13% in absolute 
terms from the results produced by the micro-census dataset of the SFSO 2005 as presented in table 1.  
5. Conclusion 
In contrast to currently existing models, ours is able to quantify the effects of a tax on fuel and/or a tax on car 
ownership on both the car ownership and the cars' use. Our model made it also possible to measure the effects of 
two mechanisms leading to a decrease in aggregate driving distance when the fuel price is increased, namely: The 
first one is determined by households with a rather high preference for car driving that will keep the car, but they 
 
12
 Note, that 
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )2 2
2 2 2 2
0 , 0 ,
2 2 2 2
0 0 0 0 0.190.11 ,
0 0
0
0 0 0.81
.0258ε ε> =
∂ > ∂ = = =
= ⋅ = − ⋅ ⋅ = − ⋅ = − ⋅ =
∂ > ∂ = > >fuel fuel
fuel fuel
P X p P X p
fuel fuel
p pP X P X P X P X
p P X p P X P X P X
 
where   for  ( )2 0P X =   we  use   the   value   of   the  dataset   from   which   the   observations  ( )2 20 cx X ς< <    and   2 60,000kmx >  
were removed. Note, that the values of ( )2 20 ,ε >P X k  and ( )2 0 ,ε >P X y  are computed analogously. 
13
 We computed these effects as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2
2
2
2, 0 22 2
2 2,
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 20 ,
0
mean 0.28 13,890km 3889.2km, 
0 0.10 0.1890 5000 94.5km. 94.5/ 3889.2 2.4%.
fuel
fuel
P X effect
cE X p
cP X p
dx dP Xdx dx
x x
dp p dp p dp p dp p
P X x
ε ς
ε ς
=
=
=
= ⋅ = ⋅ = = ⋅ = =
= ⋅ = ⋅ = ⋅ ⋅ = =
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2
2
2
2, 0 22 2
2 2,
2 20 ,
0
mean 0.80 13,890km=11,112 km, 
0 0.80 0.1890 5,000 1,275.8km. 1,275.8/11,112 11.5%.
ε ς
ε ς
=
=
=
= ⋅ = ⋅ = ⋅ = =
= ⋅ = ⋅ = ⋅ ⋅ = =
P X effect
cE X y
cP X y
dx dP Xdx dx
x x
dy y dy y dy y dy y
P X x
 
14
 The relative effect can be computed as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
2 2 2 2 2 2 2, ,
1 mean 0 mean mean 0.1601 ...
... 0.28 0.16 1 0.19 13,890 km7,033CHF 0.077825 litre/km 1.729 CH 5.2F/litr .e
ε ε ⋅ ⋅ − = ⋅ − =
= − − ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ =
fuelE X p E X k
k X x p
 
15
 We used the same dataset as Axhausen and Erath (2010). We gratefully thank Prof. Kay Axhausen and Dr. Alexander Erath for providing 
their dataset. 
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will reduce their annual mileage. The second mechanism is determined by households with a rather low 
preference for car driving will switch from owning a car to become carless and therefore reducing their annual 
mileage form about at least 5,000km per year to zero. Our model shows, that the effect of the first mechanism 
dominates the one of the second, since only a few households will sell their car, if fuel prices increase. 
Furthermore, the model made it possible to show that a tax on car ownership is – per unit of tax revenue – much 
less effective as a tax on fuel. It is noteworthy that the model adapts the data very well, even though we only 
estimate four parameters. 
The fact that the model contains a utility function opens the way for more applications such as computing the 
Hicksian compensating variation when fuel prices increase for each household or the household's willingness to 
pay for car ownership.  
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